< Inicio

< Editoriales y opinión

<el mundo

A la derecha, la puerta que conduce a varias zonas restringidas del aeropuerto, incluida la azotea. No tiene nigún letrero de "Prohibido elpaso" ni alarmas, ni camáras. Está abierta casi todo el tiempo delante de una cafetería. Entrando, a mano izquierda, estan las escaleras para bajar, subir y tener acceso a cualquier parte, aunque si lo prefieren hay un ascensor.. Incomprensiblemente, una planta más abajo, el acceso tiene código de seguridad.

 

What you can see arriving to the airport
 
World Image Press
   
                           
 
                 
                 
 
                     
               
 
     
 
               
                                   
109 days On Strike  
   
 
 
Spain put at risk
 
antiterrorist safety in Europe
Por Pablo Jato / WIP

Spain - November 2007

Is it possible to carry out a terrorist act on a plane, with a plane or at an airport? The answer is yes. How? It's as simple as finding an airport whose security is defective. There is no scarcity of airports that have chinks in their security armor. It's only necessary that there be ONE out there so that terrorists might slip in and inflict a disaster on an international scale. And where are those airports? In a remote area of Africa or Asia? No; in Europe.
Example: The airport at Valencia, Spain. It's the most important airport in the country after Madrid and Barcelona, with direct flights to Geneva, Stockholm, Dublin, Florence, Brussels, and Casablanca.

I arrived in Valencia several days in advance to cover the IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) and shortly after getting off the plane I came upon a strange display stand showing placards in a corner of the main lobby of the airport. I went to investigate and under the awnings met some agents belonging to EULEN Security who had been on strike 100 days (see photo). When I asked whether that strike affected airport security, they came close to laughing. "Would you like to see the level of security at this airport?" one asked. He picked up a video camera and invited me to accompany him.
We passed through all the restricted areas in the place even making it onto the roof of the airport without encountering the most minimum inconvenience, with no need to use magnetic pass cards, without showing ID´s to anyone, neither guards, nor encountering latches, nor barriers, recording it all on video of course (video available). And all this during an ongoing Yellow Alert against terrorism.
Julian Gonzalez Vila has worked at the Valencia airport five years as a maximum security agent and is the current president of the company committee at EULEN. He literally told me that "Security at the airport is a lie (…) the only impediment blocking entry into the restricted zone and making off with one of the planes or packing them with explosives is a guard with a rubber club." But the information Julian provided isn't at all certain given that today, as I write this article, there isn't even a guard.
There simply is no-one. Neither are there video cameras standing guard. As a matter of fact, a beggar slipped in to sleep on a plane last year and a janitor found him the following day with a good scolding and expulsion.
There is only a lone armed member of the Guardia Civil (federal police) assigned to patrol the 15 kilometers of the airport perimeter at night. I also want to mention that this airport is threatened and has provided a target for independence-seeking terrorists for decades. In spite of that, AENA has appointed Mr. Oscar Soriano as airport chief of security (he's only been on the job four months) and for the moment he hasn't wanted to make any comments

Passengers are relieved of bottled water and other liquids according to international security norms but, what about the bottles of water that are placed on board the plane? It turns out that these bottles of water come into the airport without passing through any kind of security filter or scanner. Vehicle access to the tunnel leading to the loading and unloading zone, one of the points supposedly classified as "Maximum Security Zone," is guarded by a simple information assistant (of EULEN). This worker doesn't even qualify as a guard and only asks the drivers of the vehicles, entering to unload items, for a personal ID and the name of the company for which they work. She isn't trained to distinguish a false ID as a policeman or policewoman would. Once the time of entry along with the number of the ID document is noted on a regulation sheet, the vehicle can continue on without any problem. Once inside, the person can practically move about the entire area of the airport. A terrorist group which perhaps would wish to destroy London, Milan or Geneva (or all in one fell swoop) would find it easy, placing liquid explosives in all those bottle that are to be given out on all flights.

The local newspaper Valencia hui put this airport security to the test during the America's Cup event that given its importance, beefs up the level of vigilance: "We proved how easy it would be to pass a knife on one of their flights (.) Inside a leather sheath and hidden among the papers inside one of the pockets of a handbag was passed an 8-inch long (20 cm) knife with a 3.5-inch (9 cm) blade through the scanner at one of the airport checkpoints. We could probably have brought in anything." (redaccio@valenciahui.es / paper's email address). That means that one could easily have been able to sneak in a bomb or weapon that would have ended the lives of many people including North Americans such as Michael Douglas, a rabid fan of the America's Cup. "The house of the owner of EULEN is better protected than the airport," one of the striking employees told me.
The owner of EULEN, David Alvarez, formed the company in 1962, and today it is the largest Spanish Service Group. It protects (as if such a thing can be called 'protect.') 11 airports in Spain, some in Mexico, the Dominican Republic (a short distance from the USA) and maintains contracts in 9 more countries along with a total work force of 50,000 people and annual billing of almost 800 million Euros. The security agents at the Valencia airport have now been on strike for 110 days. They were fired among other things, for refusing to share uniforms with armed strangers and refusing to participate in the corruption organized by the directors of the airport. AENA, in league with the EULEN company obliged their agents to "retire" a minimum of 50 vehicles every day using non-authorized tow trucks, making up supposed violations of non-existent parking regulations. The owners of the vehicles had to pay in order to recover them while AENA was raking in a juicy quantity that until now, no-one knows where it went.

The local police were aware of this but never did anything about it. A few days ago, a judicial decree declared this activity illegal including the towing of the vehicles and found in favor of the striking workers although is hasn't done any good given that nobody, neither the government nor the police, seems to have taken notice of the flagrant corruption that barely showed up in the local press.

Curiously, the enormous lack of security in Spain found expression in the press due to the theft of luggage that has grown to scandalous proportions, especially in the new T4 terminal of Madrid. And the thieves? Could they be people who work at the airport for AENA, for EULEN? Yes. Would there perchance be anyone else in that zone? If a thief can organize a theft-based mafia at the airport itself, who is to say there are no terrorists or terrorist collaborators in there? Is it possible that it's that easy to come and go, bring in and take out packages or merchandise at an airport?
Some have wanted to blame the mafias for the uncontrolled hiring of strangers in these jobs although the true responsibility belongs to the central government that is unable to properly control companies like EULEN. And why?

The political connections of this company make their way into the highest levels.
Although the octogenarian David Alvarez, as King Lear, delegates operation of the company to four of his seven sons, he continues to wield the baton as far as public relations are concerned. Mr. Alvarez presumes to have as a close personal friend and guest of honor at all his public events, the selfsame José Maria Aznar, ex-president of the Spanish government and ally of George Bush in the War on Terror. Furthermore, at all his parties can be found the acme of ex-ministers and higher-ups in the Popular Party (Partido Popular in Spanish, that of Aznar). One of them is Mr. Mayor Oreja, who was the Minister of the Interior.

Starting in 1996, the year the Partido Popular came to power, the number of 63,686 security guards rose to 90,247 in 2002. In that same year the Guardia Civil and the National Police force (el Cuerpo Nacional de Policia) lost 6,000 agents. This increment has placed Spain in third place in the European Union in this category (private security guards) only surpassed by Germany and the United Kingdom according to Eurostat.

Far from seeking a solution for the striking Spanish workers (on strike for over 100 days) the situation has either been hushed up or simply removed from view. They suffer all types of threats and constant pressure in order to have them disappear from the airport scene. Executives of EULEN, accompanied by "thugs" have gone personally to remove the placards by force (see video). That demonstrates the fear EULEN has that this scandal might find its way into the press and all that lies behind it might come out into the light of day. Furthermore, AENA has committed enormous irregularities with the purpose of getting the problem off their backs, allowing these situations of violence to take place in spite of several judgments being issued in favor of the protesters.
The Coronel of the Civil Guard Joaquin Borrell, of the Valencia Command (accompanied by a captain, a lieutenant, a sub-lieutenant and other uniformed agents) during an institutional confrontation with the strikers, declared literally on the airport floor that " I pass The Governmental Delegation resoltions through my testicles" (a colorful way of saying that what the government had decreed was worthless). Of course, when asked about this deed he denies it to the point of denying he was even present in spite of more than 15 witnesses and a video placing him at the scene. The strikers are better scrutinized than the passengers.
Why hasn't the government done, nor is it doing anything, in this regard? Some time ago all the information was passed along to the highest spheres with no reply of any kind forthcoming. How is it possible that a company like EULEN is permitted to evade the law and place international security at risk? Where are the labor unions? A few days ago Zapatero received all the information in Madrid from the hands of Juan Bejarano, one of the strikers who obtained a wink and a smile in reply. Rajoy, in Valencia was greeted at the airport by an authentic snowstorm of pamphlets that he roundly ignored although he stopped by to greet the strikers. The judges, police, company directors and the news reporters are all aware of this situation. Only the politicians have any idea of the why and wherefore of the mystery.

At best, perhaps after this article is published, some cosmetic changes might be made to make it appear as though nothing has happened but that's about all. Unfortunately money has a lot more force than the law.
If these things go on in Europe; if placing a bomb on an aircraft is that easy… why so much security with the passengers? Are they deceiving us? It's business; that much is clear. It's all a simple business; terrorism, the war…hunger… Someone always gets a cut and profits from the suffering around them. A simple business; but the day an aircraft is blown up or a terrorist act is perpetrated, will the responsible politicos shrugging off the ensuing guilt say "It's business"? Who will bear the blame if tomorrow the world is faced with a catastrophe in London, Brussels, Milan or Madrid?

Pablo Jato
Word Image Press
Translation: Ronald Sefchick